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DIGITAL MUSIC SAMPLING & COPYRIGHT LAW:
CAN THE INTERESTS OF COPYRIGHT OWNERS AND SAMPLING ARTISTS BE RECONCILED?

Copyright law governing digital music sampling is faced with two competing interests:
(1) owners ofrecording and composition copyrights need to be reasonably compensated when
their creative works are re-used by sampling artists, but (2) sampling artists should have a
reasonable degree of freedom to rework fragments of existing recordings at a reasonable cost.
A system is needed that balances these interests and that reduces the degree of uncertainty that
arises whenever a sample gets used that infringes a copyright. This Essay will discuss the
current state of the law as it relates to digital sampling and will proceed to articulate five goals
that this Author believes should be taken into account by any proposed solution to the sampling
problem. It will then discuss the various proposed solutions, evaluating each one's strengths and
weaknesses with respect to the five goals, and ultimately conclude that compulsory license
schemes are best suited to solving or at least minimizing the problem.

I
Description of Sampling and Current State of the Law
Sampling has become very common in modem popular music, particularly in the genres
of rap, hip-hop, electronic dance music, as well as rock. The technique extracts fragments from
existing recordings and incorporates them into new musical works, manipulating their melodic,
harmonic, rhythmic, or vocal characteristics in various ways. The process offers infinite
possibilities in terms of refashioning the raw material and 'looping," a technique whereby a
single sample is repeated continually for an extended period.
Current copyright infringement tests relevant to sampling are vague, making it difficult
for sampling artists to know where the boundaries are. Additionally, purchasing the appropriate

licenses can be overly expensive, depending on the extent of the re-use and the cooperativeness
of the copyright holders. This situation can result in diminished musical creativity due to
1
prohibitive costs, or worse, copyright holders who just don't get paid.

The current procedure for obtaining licenses involves considerable administrative (time)
and financial costs. 2 In general, licenses must be acquired for use of both the sound recording
(typically owned by the record company) and the notated form of the musical composition
(typically owned by a publishing house or the composer).3 Recording licenses are most often
purchased via a flat fee or royalty arrangement. 4 Flat fees range from $100 to over $10,000,
while royalties to recording owners range from between half a cent to three cents for every copy
of the track sold.

5

Musical composition licenses typically give "the copyright holder a

percentage ownership in the new work's musical composition copyright," as well as an advance
of a few thousand dollars on the expected publishing income. 6 Often, 15% of the new work's
musical composition copyright might be assigned to the original work's author, and if the sample
7
is looped and used repeatedly, the percentage could increase to 66%.

For sampling artists who decline to pay for these licenses, there are currently two
defenses: de minimis and fair use. The strongest defense for sampling artists is the de minimis
doctrine, which argues that the re-use is ultimately trivial use that does not amount to
8

infringement. However, the test for determining "trivial use" is exceedingly vague. Courts
attempt to determine whether an "ordinary lay listener" would find a "substantial similarity''
9

between the pre-existing recording and the new work, or whether the "quantitative or
qualitative" appropriation of elements of the original recording are significant. 1

°

Fair use, on the

other hand, is a defense based on the idea that some unlicensed uses of copyrighted works are
justified because they serve a desired social purpose (i.e. criticism, commentary, etc.). 11 As a

2

defense in sampling cases, fair use has general ly only been successful for new musical works
that parody pre-existing recorded works.

12

These defenses, however, have been threatened b y a recent Sixth Circuit ruling. In

Bridgeport Music Inc. v. Dimension Films. the court articulated a new. bright-line test whereby
any unlicensed copying of a sound recording, no matter how minor, constitutes infringement. 1 3
Th e court reasoned that, because 1 7 U. S . C . § l 1 4(b) gives a sound recording copyright holder
the exclusive right '<to duplicate the sound recording; any duplication whatsoever amounts to
infringement.

14

If this decision were applied nationwide, both the de minimis and fair use

defenses would no longer apply in the context of sound recordings. As such, thi s decision is
unworkable and completely fails to balance the competing interests of copyright holders and
sampling artists.
II
Goals for Any Proposed Solution
The Constitution is clear regarding the purpose of copyright law: it should "promote the
Progress of Science and the useful Arts." 1 5 In other words, copyright law should encourage
creativity.

16

However, as discussed above, the current state of the law tends to discourage the

creativity of sampling artists. The problem remains : how can we balance fair compensation for
copyright holders without inhibiting the development of sampled music genres?
This Author proposes that any potential solution to the sampling copyright problem
should aim to achieve five goals. The solution should: ( 1 ) set clear, predictable boundaries for
sampling artists, (2) keep costs reasonable for sampling arti sts, (3 ) minimize litigation as the
means to settle infringement questions, (4) minimize the difficulties involved in negotiating
licenses and (5) provide adequate economic benefits for copyright holders (so that they wi l l
have an incentive t o produce new works). The first four goals tend t o encourage the creati vity of

3

sampling artists, while the fifth goal encourages creativity among composers of new music that
does not incorporate samples. Additionally, goals three and four would reduce administrative
and enforcement costs for copyright holders.

17

III
Alternatives to Current Tests
The following alternatives have been proposed by various commentators as means to
solve the sampling problem : Compulsory Licensing, Voluntary Structured Negotiation, the
Economic Approach, the Pattern-Oriented Approach, and Educational Use.
A. Compulsory Licensing
Compulsory license schemes for samples would be based on the current compulsory
mechanical license for the recording of "cover songs," or new versions of existing songs. When
an artist covers a song, they must purchase a compulsory mechanical license from the copyright
holder pursuant to Section 1 1 5 of the Copyright Act.

18

The current rate is 8 .5 cents (or 1 . 65

cents per minute) paid to the original work's publisher for every copy of the track sold.

19

A fair licensing scheme fo r samples would need t o take into account the length and
substantiality of the fragment sampled in determining the appropriate rate. 20 At least two
different means have been proposed to vary the compulsory license fees according to the
substantiality of the re-use: ( 1 ) Charles E. Maier's approach and (2) Josh Norek's approach.2 1
Maier divides the spectrum of re-uses into three categories.

22

The first category,

"Substantial Violations" (i.e. the new work is more "imitative" than ''transformative"), would
require payment oftbe same rate that applies for cover songs. The second category, De Minimis
and "Transformative" Uses, would require no fee payment. For the majority of cases, those in

4

between the above two categories, payment of only a portion of the current compulsory license
fee would be required (i . e. 50%) .
Norek also proposes three basic subdivisions for varying compulsory license fees
according to the substantiality of the re-use.

23

First, "Qualitatively Insignificant Samples" (i.e.

someone familiar with the original work would not easily identi fy or recognize the source of the
sample without having been told of its source) and "Qualitatively Significant Samples of Three

Seconds or Less Used Only Once" would require no payment. Second, a "Qualitatively
Significant Sample of Three Seconds or Less That Is Looped and Occurs Repeatedly" would
require payment of only a portion of the current compulsory license fee; Norek suggests two
cents for every copy sold. Finally, "Qualitatively Significant Samples Greater Than Three

Seconds" would continue to require "negotiation and clearance of both the sound recording and
the musical composition, as per current music industry practice. "24
These Compulsory Licensing schemes would, for the most part, achieve the five goals set
forth in Section II above. Copyright holders would be adequately compensated, sampling artists
would pay reasonable licensing fees tailored to the substantiality of their re-uses, and negotiation
time would generally be minimized. Norek 's proposal would eliminate a considerable portion of
the work of negotiating licenses, at least for the maj ority of samples that are three seconds or less
in length . Maier's approach would largely eliminate the need for negotiation, provided that
sampling artists and copyright holders could agree on which of the three categories applied in
any given case .
To some extent, however, these proposals fail to entirely eliminate the need for litigation
and do not achieve complete clarity in defining the boundaries to sampl ing artists. For instance,
in Norek 's proposal, "Qualitatively Significant Samples Greater Than Three Seconds" would

5

still be negoti ated as per current music industry practice. There is also the potentially tricky
matter of detennining when a sample is "Qualitatively Insignificant." Under Maier's proposal,
substantial re-uses would be charged at the cover song rate, de minim.is uses would be free, and
most cases in between would require payment of half the cover song rate. Maier assumes that
the extent of samp ling in the maj ority of new works would fall somewhere between de minimis
and substantial re-use. However, many of the same problems might inevitably arise because the
boundaries between categories remain unclear and litigation would probably be needed to
resolve infringement questions .
B. Voluntary Structured Negotiation
Jason H. Marcus argues that institution of a compulsory licensing system for samples
would be impractical and premature because it ''would require absolute cooperation of all in the
music industry, and may need to be statutory in order to be implemented ."25 Instead, he supports
a "voluntary scheme, which, if effective over an extended period of time, could then be reported
to Congress and the Copyright Office with the goal of possibly amending the Copyright Act to
26
apply to digital sampling."
The Voluntary Negotiation approach proposed by Marcus invo lves a licensing system
based on good faith and fair dealing whereby artists negotiate with copyright holders in a
predictable, established manner.

27

Record companies and sampling artists would have general

guidelines to fol low during negotiations relating to reasonable pricing expectations and the
negotiation process itself. Apparently, the record industry and musicians unions could work
together to establish the guidelines. The goal would be to avoid l itigation and to balance fair
financial rewards for sampled artists and artistic freedom for sampling artists.

28

Sampling artists or their representatives would first attempt to obtain clearances

6

without payment for all samples used. The� the parties would negotiate payment schedules for
the remaining samples at fair and reasonable rates, taking into consideration various factors
speci fic to each si tuation, including the substantiality of the re-use and "whether the use is
offensive to the holder of the copyright."

29

Some obvious problems with the Voluntary Structured Negotiation approach are that
there is no guarantee of fair dealjng and all the players in the industry may not be wil ling to go
along with the guidelines . If copyri ght owners choose not to fol low the guidelines, then a chain
reaction of negative consequences could result. Sampling artists might face unreasonably high
costs, extensive negotiations and litigation could follow, and the ideal of clear boundaries for
sampling artists by way of the guidelines would become meaningless.
In theory, this approach minimizes the difficu lty of negotiating licenses because the
parties can follow general negotiation guidel ines. However, unless definitive guidelines become
established and widely practiced throughout the industry, this approach may not drastically
reduce the significant admini strative (time) and financial costs associ ated with the current
system.
C. Economic Approach
David S. Blessing has formulated an approach that weighs the various costs to copyright
holders and sampling artists . The social costs of copyright protection involve two major
categories : ( 1 ) access costs and (2) administrative and enforcement costs.3° Access costs fall on
both consumers and sampling artists. Consumers who value the work at less than its price won't
pay for it and are denied access. Likewise, access costs fall on sampling artists "who are
deterred from buililing upon prior works because they are unwil ling to pay the price the

7

copyright ho lder demands."3 1 Thus, access costs generally discourage the creation of new works
that incorporate samples .
Administrative and enforcement costs include the "costs of exc ludi ng trespassers, and
apprehending and sanctioning violators," as well as the costs of setting up the boundaries of what
constitutes permissible re-use of a work. 32 From an artist's perspective, enforcement costs are a
necessary evil because some degree of copyright protection is needed in order to create economic
incentives for the creation of original works. However, an artist's incentive to protect works via
copyright only goes so far: if enforcement costs are too high, then it may not be practical to
protect certain elements of the artist's work (i .e. de minimis elements).
A proper infringement test would keep both access costs and enforcement costs low.
Thus, this kind of economic approach "allows unauthorized borrowing in numerous
circumstances that in turn promote artistic innovation."

33

Blessing suggests the following as

guiding questions: Did the original artist contemplate that portions of his work would be
extracted, and did this discourage his creative effort? Does the sampling artist's reuse of the
extraction tend to discourage other artists from composing original works?

34

If the answer is no,

then the reuse is trivial, or de minimis.
The Economic Approach attempts to be objective and take into account all of the subtle
economic factors affecting copyright owners and sampling artists. However, the approach is
flawed because, as B lessing himself notes, it 'is too ambiguous and requires an ad hoc
analysis."35 Thus, the proposal does not aid in setting clear, predictable boundaries for sampling
artists. It is not likely that negotiation time or the need for litigation would be reduced by this
approach . Moreover, it seems unlikely to this Author that the practices of sampling artists would

8

ever deter other artists from composing original works. Hence, Blessing' s plan may
disproportionately benefit sampling artists while leaving copyright holders under-compensated.
D. Pattern-Oriented Approach
Professor Michael J . Madison argues that courts should consider social and cultural
patterns in assessing the merits of a fair use defense. 36 Specifically, Madison accepts as fair any
form of re-use that "falls within the boundaries of a recognized social or cultural pattern ."37
Patterns are social and cultural structures "that involve relatively stable sets of beliefs and
practices grouped around individuals, institutions, and (often) goals."38 However, not just any
pattern would be sufficient: "the decided cases suggest that the pattern should have a pedi gree of
tradition and history such that the practices embedded in the pattern are characteristically
recognized as ' creative' or at least tending to promote some sort of 'progress' that does not
depend on the market economy."39 These kinds of patterns would be more legitimately valued
by reason of their documented presence in society.
The Copyright Act already recognizes a list of such patterns as fair-use: "criticism,
comment, news reporting, teaching . . . scholarship, or research.',4o The phenomenon of
sampling could also be considered a legitimate cultural pattern justifying application of the fair
use defense whenever it occurs.
Although Madison' s approach has promise as a legitimate basis for the fair use defense, it
does not offer any clear answers to the problem of establishing the boundaries of permissible,
non-licensed sampling. Professor Madison suggests that, i f sampling is accepted as a socially
recognizable pattern, then virtually any kind of sampling could be considered fair use. This
result fai ls to acknowledge the copyright holder's need to be adequately compensated for the use
of his/her works. Without a doubt, sampling artists would be pleased if this approach were to
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gain a foothold because they would no longer have to negotiate or pay for licenses or face
copyright holders in court. But that result wou ld be fundamentally unfair to copyright holders
who deserve some kind of compensation for their creative contributions.
E. Educational Use
Evans C . Anyanwu argues that rap music ' is mainly social commentary providing the
world with a useful and artistic depiction of life in the Black community.',4 1 In his view, the
informative and educational value of rap justifies the protection of most sampling as fair use
under the Copyright Act.

42

He supports his position with a report by education professors in The

English Journal, which states that "[h] ip-hop can be used as a bridge linking the seemingly vast
span between the streets and the world of Academics.',4 3 Rap music and sampling, he says,
should be encouraged because of their potential for "enriching a poor and undereducated
segment o f [African] Americans. , ,44
Like the Pattern-Oriented Approach, Anyanwu 's proposal is flawed because it refuses to
acknowledge the interests of copyright holders who desire compensation for their original,
creative works. Anyanwu doesn 't even try to balance the competing interests of copyright
holders and sampling artists, rejecting the former interest as somehow violative of human rights
and/or progressive values. Therefore, his approach is impractical and fundamentally unsound.
N
Conclusion
Each of these alternative proposals would achieve some of the goals discussed above in
Section II, but it seems that none of these approaches would fully achieve them all. The Pattem
Oriented, Educational Use, and Economic approaches seem to disproportionately benefit
sampling artists whi le leaving copyright holders largely uncompensated. On the other hand, the

Voluntary Structured Negotiation approach has l imited potential because it does not radically
di ffer from the present system . Ultimately, the Compulsory Licensing schemes come closest to
achieving the five goals.
Although Compulsory Licensing schemes do not completely eliminate all of the
uncertainties involved in sampling infringement questions, they nevertheless seem preferable to
the other alternatives because they generally offer more clearly defined boundaries for sampling
artists, thereby minimizing the need for litigation and ad-hoc determinations. No other proposal
even comes close to matching the potential of compulsory licenses in minimizing the difficulty
of negotiating the terms of licenses, while satisfying the economic interests of both copyright
holders and sampling artists. And in the end, the solution that balances the financial
requirements of these parties, while minimizing the extent of their interactions, is probably the
best one.
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